Next, we compare the pre-crisis demand for IR/GDP of 9 EMs that experienced sizable depletion of their IR during July 08-Feb. 09 (IR losses 10%), to the 11 EMs that did not (IR losses < 10%), and find differential patterns across the two groups. 
For EMs that experienced a sizable IR depletion in the first phase of the crisis
Trade factors (trade openness, primary goods export) were more significant in accounting for the pre-crisis IR/GDP levels. EMs that internalized their large trade exposure before the crisis used IR as a buffer stock. IR losses followed an inverted logistical curve, losing not more than 1/3 of their pre crisis IR.
Financial factors seem more important than trade factors in explaining their initial level of IR/GDP. These countries achieved external adjustment through large depreciations of their currencies.
For the EMs that refrained from using IR
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The adjustment of EMs during the crisis has been constrained more by fear of losing IR than by fear of floating.
The fear of losing IR may reflect A country's concern that dwindling IR signals greater vulnerability, thereby triggering a run on its remaining reserves. A country's apprehension that, as the duration of the crisis is unknown, depleting IR quickly may be suboptimal. Implication: Prudential supervision tightening the link between short-term external borrowing and hoarding IR would mitigate the excessive exposure to deleveraging risks induced by short-term external borrowing.
Balance sheet exposure matters
The case for using IR tends to be stronger for countries with a significant balance sheet exposure, at times of deleveraging.
The case for depreciation tends to be stronger for countries with a limited balance sheet exposure, at times of global recessionary pressure.
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Results accounting IR losses of the 21 EMs
EMs with large primary commodity exports, especially oil export, tend to experience relatively large IR losses during the 2008-9 global crisis. EMs with a medium level of financial openness lost a larger share of their IR holdings.
Countries with large short term external debts tend to have relatively large IR losses during the crisis. Larger IR/GDP pre-crisis levels were associated with large IR/GDP declines during the crisis period. Next, we split the sample into I. EMs with large IR losses, 10% (9 countries) and II. small losses (or possible gains) < 10%, 11 countries.
Contrasting the pre-crisis IR demand of I and II
For EMs experiencing large IR depletion, trade factors (trade openness, trade shocks, primary goods export ratio) were more important in accounting for their pre crisis IR than for the second group.
For EMs experiencing small or no IR depletion, financial factors are much more significant, EMs with stricter financial controls and lower exchange rate flexibility tend to have a higher pre-crisis level of IR/GDP. An F test confirms that trade and financial related factors played different roles in these two groups.
From the "fear of floating" (before the crisis) to the "fear of losing IR" during the crisis
Using less than 1/3 of initial IR by group I, and refraining from using reserves by group II, are consistent with the "fear of losing reserves". EMs' adjustment was constrained more by their fear of losing IR than by their fear of floating.
Possible interpretations:
Uncertainty regarding crisis duration and depth. EMs fear that reducing IR/GDP ratio below the average of its reference group would increase its vulnerability to deleveraging and sudden stop crisis. During times of low inflation, EMs were willing to depreciate to keep or improve their competitiveness. Large trade losses, balance sheet exposure and deleveraging induced group I to adjust both by large depreciations and sizable depletion of IR.
Only 1/2 of EMs relied on IR depletion as part of the adjustment mechanism IR depletion followed (inverted) logistic pattern, reached within seven months a markedly declining rate of reserve depletion, losing not more than 1/3 of their pre-crisis IR. Fitting the logistic curves, we find A tradeoff between tolerating ER adjustment and IR adjustment.
EMs which had begun depleting their IR sooner had also an earlier turning point. 
